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1. Introduction 
After more than five years of intensive negotiations, the US and eleven other Pacific Rim coun-
tries – Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singa-
pore, and Vietnam – concluded the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal on 5 October in Atlan-
ta establishing the world’s largest free trade zone of 800 million people with a combined GDP 
of US $28 trillion (about 37% of world GDP measured in current US dollars). Apart from ad-
dressing traditional trade issues such as the abolition of duties and quotas, it is intended to break 
new ground on issues such as labor laws and technology. 
US president Barack Obama welcomed the TPP stating that it will “eliminate more than 18,000 
taxes that various countries put on US products.” The deal “reflects America’s values and gives 
our workers the fair shot at success they deserve” he argued, adding that the US should not “let 
countries like China write the rules of the global economy”. 
In a separate statement the US Trade Representative (USTR) Office underlined that the “TPP 
brings higher standards to nearly 40 percent of the global economy.” 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reporters the deal was a “major outcome not just for 
Japan but also for the future of the Asia-Pacific”. 
Tim Groser, New Zealand’s Trade Minister said the “strategic” implications of the deal for 
global trade were “enormous.” 
“Today is a historic day. It is a great day for Canada. It is a great day for Canadians”, Canadi-
an Prime Minister Stephen Harper said during a press conference announcing the deal. “It is 
going to be the new gold standard for global trade agreements”, he added. 
EU trade commissioner Malmström also welcomed the conclusion of TPP negotiations. At the 
same time, many observers fear that TPP will marginalize Europe in the race to shape global 
standards and rules. 
Negotiations on a TPP- agreement started in 2010. They build on a predecessor agreement: the 
so called Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singa-
pore, which was signed in 2005, and entered into force in 2006. In 2008, the US joined the talks. 
As of 2014, twelve countries are part of the trade negotiations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States of America and 
Vietnam. 
For the US, the TPP is an important part of a strategy reorientation towards East Asia, the so 
called pivot. The key areas of this regional strategy are: “strengthening bilateral security 
alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; 
engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a 
broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.”1 The Obama ad-
ministration made TPP one of the top priorities in its trade agenda. Repeatedly, in his State of 
                                            
1 Richard Bush (2012), The Response of China’s Neighbors to the U.S. "Pivot" to Asia, Brookings Institution Brief, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-us-pivot-bush 
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the Union speeches, the president referred to these talks. They are an important part of the US’s 
pivot towards East Asia. 
The deal has now to be signed formally by each country and ratified by the respective parlia-
ment. A “comprehensive” text of the agreement in principle has yet to be released, but corner-
stones of the deal have become public. Ratification is by no means certain. Hilary Clinton, the 
likely presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in the US, has said about the deal “As of 
today, I am not in favor of what I have learned about it”.2 An interesting debate during the pres-
idential campaign is sure to follow. 
Yet, the question arises, whether the enthusiastic remarks with which heads of government cel-
ebrated the breakthrough are not entirely overblown. So, in this report we ask: 
- What are the economic advantages of TPP to the insider countries? Who benefits most? 
- How are outsiders, such as Europe or China, affected? 
- What is the price that the TPP countries pay for keeping China out? 
 
2. What the agreement is about 
Goods 
The TPP agreement abolishes tariffs in a wide array of products, relaxes quantitative re-
strictions, and establishes mechanisms to avoid unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures as well as technical barriers to trade (TBT). These policy changes also affect the sensi-
tive agricultural, food, and textile markets, but a number of compromises have been made. 
Central areas of conflict have been sugar, milk quotas, rules of origin in the automotive indus-
try, and bio-pharmaceuticals. New Zealand and Australia negotiated a better access to the US 
milk market, which is still strongly protected. In return, American dairy farmers asked for better 
access to the Canadian and Japanese milk markets, where tariff and non-tariff protection is very 
high. Details on the negotiated quota and tariff system are still not known, but all sides must 
have made compromises. 
In the automotive industry, Canada and Mexico have strong incentives to demand very strict 
rules of origin, so that the use of car parts produced outside of the TPP zone must be small 
enough for the final car to enjoy tariff-free access. Japan has opposite incentives, because it 
sources a large share of car parts from non-TPP countries such as Thailand. Here, too, a bargain 
was struck, with details still pending. 
Public procurement is a thorny issue in many countries, in particular in the US which has ruled 
out to drop policies such as Buy American requirements or measures that privilege small busi-
nesses in obtaining government contracts.  
Services 
In the area of services, TPP focuses on improving transparency and predictability of regulatory 
procedures with a special emphasis on financial services and telecommunications. Given very 
                                            
2 CNN, Oct 7, 2015. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/07/politics/hillary-clinton-opposes-tpp/index.html 
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different states of development of participating nations, and very different political orientations, 
market access improvements are however limited. Yet, the agreement is the first one to address 
digital trade and a friction free operation of the global internet. It includes provisions on protec-
tion of practices such as cloud computing and prevents national governments from requiring 
that TPP companies build data centers to store data as a condition for operating in a TPP market.  
Intellectual property 
The agreement includes several provisions that build on foundations established in the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and other international 
intellectual property agreements, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty. The objective is to protect patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, including 
safeguards against cyber theft of trade secrets. Controversially, the USA wanted to protect the 
inventors of bio-pharmaceuticals for 12 years after the end of patents by granting them the right 
not to share the data on their products. This implies that producers of generic pharmaceuticals 
cannot simply use the data of the original inventors when they seek market admission of their 
products, but have to provide own data and tests which results in higher costs. Australia, for 
example, grants “data exclusivity” rights for five years. The TPP compromise resulted in a 
common limit of 8 years.  
Investment 
The deal also includes the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism that will allow 
investors to bring TPP governments to arbitration. At the request of Australia, which has no 
ISDS mechanism with the US yet, the ISDS mechanism will not cover the tobacco industry. 
Level playing field 
Since TPP is an agreement that covers some of the richest and most advanced countries of the 
world (such as the US) but also some rather poor ones (such as Peru, Malaysia, or Vietnam), 
special attention was paid to the need of guaranteeing a level playing field for all market partici-
pants. For this reason, the deal sets up new workers’ rights, including rules on child labor, 
forced labor and discrimination. It also includes rules on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
still play a huge role in an officially communist country such as Vietnam. Since rules like these 
are missing in existing agreements that tie TPP members (such as the North American Free 
Trade Area, NAFTA), these existing pacts are updated by TPP. 
Summarizing 
From what is known to date, TPP is more of a standard trade agreement of the type that the US 
or the EU have signed in the last years (e.g., with South Korea) than of a new generation deal 
that cuts into new topics such as regulatory cooperation, the mutual recognition of standards, or 
the joint setting of standards. It does not go very far in services or government procurement, and 
important carve-outs in agriculture are very likely. 
What this means for our simulations 
TPP is an ambitious agreement, in that it brings together some of the richest and most developed 
countries of the world with rather poor ones, one of which still has a communist regime (Vi-
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etnam has a single party system and has a per capita GDP that is just one tenth of the US level, 
measured in purchasing power parities). This wide geographical and developmental reach does 
limit its depth. In the simulations below, we assume that the TPP agreement eliminates all tariffs 
between the parties (even if we know that some tariffs may remain for certain products). And 
we assume that the agreement reduces non-tariff barriers by as much as medium-depth agree-
ments that already exist do. We describe the methodology in more detail below. 
3. Some Facts about the TTP partners 
The following illustration illustrates key facts on the TPP region. The agreement would cover 
roughly 40% of world GDP, 10% of world population and 20% of world trade. However, the 
degree of heterogeneity is huge. Figure 1 shows that, in 2014, the GDP per capita in current 
USD is more than 60,000 USD in Australia while it is just about 2,000 USD in Vietnam. In 
purchasing power parities (PPP), discrepancies look similarly large.3 Peru, Mexico, Malaysia 
and Chile are substantially richer than Vietnam, but the per capita income of the richest of these, 
Chile, still is just one quarter of the Australian level. 
 
Figure 1 GDP per capita in the 12 TPP partner countries, 2014, in thousands 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. New Zealand: data refers to 2013. Authors’ illustration. 
Figure 3 reveals another two dimensions of heterogeneity. First, the TPP agreement is very 
strongly dominated by the economic clout of the USA. The figure ranks TPP member states 
according to falling GDP, measured in current US dollars. The solid red line in the illustration 
shows the cumulated share of countries in total TPP GDP. The US accounts for almost 62% of 
the TPP’s economic power, together with the other rich OECD countries Japan, Canada and 
                                            
3 In the current context, income per person should be measured in the currency which is used for international trans-
actions. 
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Australia, the share rises to about 90%. Together, Vietnam and Brunei add less than 1 percent to 
total TPP GDP. 
Figure 2 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
 
Source: ifo Institute. Data from World Development Indicators. 
 
In terms of recent growth rates (of GDP in constant 2005 US dollars), it is however the coun-
tries with smaller GDPs that have tended to grow faster (with the exception of ultra-rich Brunei 
and New Zealand). The TPP region as a whole featured an average growth rate of real per capita 
income of more than 4% over the last ten years, according to World Bank data. The TPP coun-
tries form a dynamic region, and the region’s rising level of income makes it an increasingly 
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attractive market for companies from the US and Europe. Looking into the future, this is why 
the agreement makes sense to the USA and why it may pose threats to Europe. 
Figure 3 Shares in total GDP of TPP group and average GDP growth over last 5 years, % 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, Author’s illustration. 
Figure 4 Total trade (exports plus imports, goods and services) over GDP in the TPP 
countries, % 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, own illustration. Data refer to the year of 2013. Author’s illustration. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows that the TPP members differ dramatically with respect to their degree of 
openness as measured by total trade (goods plus services) as a fraction of GDP. Singapore is the 
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world’s most open economy: exports plus imports amount to almost 360% of GDP. In the US, 
in contrast, this share is merely 30%. 
This heterogeneity explains the difficulties in finding common ground and also explains the fact 
that the agreement has a strong focus on development related aspects such as labor and envi-
ronmental issues. 
 
 
4. Including China: The Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
Other countries, which are currently left out of the TPP agreement, have signaled their interest 
in joining the agreement. These countries are Colombia, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Tai-
wan, and South Korea.  
China is not yet in this group. However, it has advocated another big trade policy initiative in 
Asia at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Beijing in November 2014, 
which brings the TPP countries, and other Pacific Rim countries including China together into a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). APEC leaders agreed to launch “a collective 
strategic study” on the FTAAP and instruct officials to undertake the study, consult stakeholders 
and report the result by the end of 2016. However, the idea for a free trade area spanning the 
Pacific has been around for almost 50 years.  
Although originally proposed by the US, the push for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific has 
not been welcome by the US which appears to have resisted conducting a full feasibility study. 
The US seems to not want FTAAP negotiations to start before TPP is completed. TPP would 
give the US more pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region than an FTAAP that also includes 
China and Russia would.  
An FTAAP agreement would be even bigger than TPP. It would cover 21 countries, including 
two of the world’s three largest economies, and many other fast growing countries. In total, it 
would account for 2.7 bn. consumers, 40% of the world’s population. It would cover 56% of 
world GDP, i.e., 43 trillion USD. In terms of economic size, the agreement would be truly gi-
gantic, letting the TTIP agreement that the EU is negotiating with the US look like a minor un-
dertaking.  
For the time being, it is unclear how comprehensive and deep an FTAAP could be. This would 
depend on the precise mix of countries that engage in negotiations. It is hard to imagine trade 
talks between the US and Russia, both being APEC members. Also negotiations between China 
and the US would imply a full turn-around of the containment strategy that the US has practiced 
towards China in the last decade. Petri et al. (2014) have described FTAAP as an intermediate 
agreement, less ambitious than TPP but more so than the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) agreement that China is pursuing with ASEAN countries (many of which 
are either in TPP or in the list of interested countries) and other major trade partners such as 
India. 
In any case, the Chinese initiative, and its endorsement at the APEC summit shows that regional 
economic integration in South and East Asia is likely to progress in the future in one or the other 
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way. TPP, RCEP, and FTAAP take different forms and have different levels of ambition for the 
included countries. Yet, they will all affect Germany, Europe, and other countries left out. Their 
size will make them potentially relevant for the entire world trade order. 
Below, we not only look at the effects TPP could have on countries around the world, but also 
study the FTAAP agreement. This will show how costly it is to exclude China and which addi-
tional advantages a larger regional agreement would possibly deliver. 
 
 
5. Modelling the effects of trade agreements 
To simulate the effects of a trade agreement such as TPP or FTAAP, one needs a model of the 
world economy that accounts for countries’ different levels of development, for their different 
geographical locations, the particular structure of their cultural, linguistic and political bilateral 
ties. A model that is able to do this is the one developed by Caliendo and Parro (2015). Aichele 
et al. (2014) have added non-tariff barriers and services sectors to this model, and have prepared 
it for the ex-ante analysis of trade agreements.4 
The key idea is to provide a mathematical framework that is able to replicate the structure of 
world trade, of sectoral value added, and of aggregate incomes at the country-level as it is ob-
served in the status quo data. This is no easy task, because the world consists of roughly 170 
independent nations, and so there are 170 times 169 possible trade links (28,730) in each of the 
30 sectors of economic activity we model.  
The status quo situation takes account of the structure of trade barriers as they exist in the data: 
tariffs, and the sum of all other barriers that hinder the flow of goods and services across inter-
national borders. Some of these barriers are given by nature, such as geographical distance, or 
have been formed by thousands of years of history, such as language ties. Others can be 
changed by trade agreements. These non-tariff barriers are hard to quantify empirically. The 
nice feature of the employed model is that the level of these barriers need not be known; it is 
enough to know the expected change of these barriers due to the proposed agreement. 
To define an appropriate scenario, one could simply assume changes in these barriers. This is 
not what we do in this paper. Rather, we assume that the proposed agreements, both TPP and 
FTAAP will be as successful in reducing non-tariff barriers between member states as other, 
comparable agreements. We use data from Dür et al. (2014), who have classified the hundreds 
of existing trade agreements with respect to their depth. In our setup, the studied trade agree-
ments are more than just about tariffs, but they fall short from the most ambitious agreements 
that reach deep into non-tariff barriers, such as NAFTA or the EU. 
The simulations we report below answer the following question: what if, in the world as we 
observe it today, there were a trade agreement between the TPP countries that is as comprehen-
sive and as deep as other medium-depth agreements that already exist? 
                                            
4 For more detail than what we can reasonably cover here, we refer the reader to the mentioned papers; the Appendix 
also discusses some important aspects. 
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The simulations return a wealth of data on things such as changes in the sectoral trade structure, 
the sectoral value added, total income, prices and price indices of all countries. In this brief re-
port, we limit ourselves to describing the effects on real per capita incomes. Trade, of course, is 
not an objective per se; whether an agreement is successful or not is measured by its effect on 
average incomes.5 
Changes in per capita incomes derive from two sources: changes in income, expressed in inter-
national currency, and changes in the aggregate price index (i.e., the cost of purchasing a repre-
sentative basket of goods). Due to the agreement, incomes may increase as lower trade costs 
allow countries to specialize more strongly on the sectors in which they enjoy a comparative 
advantage, or because they allow concentrating production of specific goods at fewer places, 
therefore enabling economies of scale. Incomes may fall, however, because tariffs on imported 
goods no longer reach the public coffers. The price level may fall because lower trade costs 
imply that foreign goods are delivered more cheaply to domestic consumers, and because spe-
cialization or economies of scale lower production costs of foreign and domestic producers.  
In most of the following tables, we use a multi-industry model that replicates the pattern of spe-
cialization of about 130 countries (and some aggregate regions that collect many small countries 
for which data coverage is insufficient) in about 30 sectors. A key assumption in this exercise is 
that the technological structure of comparative advantage does not change due to TPP. This may 
be correct in the medium run, but in the very long run, systemically relevant trade agreements 
may affect sectoral productivity levels and, thus, the technological structure of comparative 
advantage. We turn to results provided by Felbermayr et al. (2015) to address this issue. 
Regional trade agreements do not cover all countries of the world. Because they reduce trade 
costs between insiders, but not between insiders and outsiders to the agreements, they reduce the 
competitiveness of outsiders relative to insiders. This is why these agreements are also called 
‘preferential’: they extend preferences to certain countries but withhold them from others. This 
leads to trade creation between insiders, and to trade diversion between in- and outsiders to the 
extent that they produce similar goods. However, because a successful agreement raises in-
comes in the insider countries, and this income is spent on goods from all over the world, out-
siders can benefit as well. This income (or scale) effect is magnified, if outsider countries are 
strongly tied into value added chains of insiders: then, higher production triggers higher demand 
for raw materials, or components. If these income effects are strong enough compared to the 
diversion effects, then outsiders can actually benefit from a preferential trade agreement. 
The reported numbers are to be understood as the long-run effects that materialize over time and 
are, as evidence suggests, (almost) fully available after 10 years. Since income is a flow varia-
ble, an increase by x % means that incomes are permanently higher by this percentage amount 
for the entire history after the agreement is in full swing, holding all other determinants of per 
capita incomes constant. 
 
                                            
5 The model, like many others, is silent on distributional consequences within countries. This is a shortcoming. Note, 
however, that trade may affect the structure of gross incomes. What matters, however, for individual incomes are net 
incomes which are shaped by the tax-and-transfer system. 
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6. The effects of Pacific agreements for members 
In Table 1 we report the effects that the TPP and the FTAAP agreements would have on current 
real per capita incomes. Looking first at the TPP deal, it is clear that merely eliminating tariffs 
would not affect per capita incomes much. The reason is that tariffs are already low between the 
OECD countries, and between TPP members that already have trade agreements with each other 
(as, e.g., the US has with Chile or Peru). Only Vietnam and New Zealand benefit in a measura-
ble way from a tariffs-only TPP. In the case of New Zealand this is because of the fact that the 
country has no bilateral trade agreements in place with large TPP members such as Japan, the 
US or Canada. 
 
Table 1 Effects of TPP and FTAAP on real per capita income in insider countries, % 
  Membership 
Real income change (in %) 
 
TPP FTAAP 
  TPP FTAAP tariffs comprehensive tariffs comprehensive 
Australia yes yes 0.06 4.52 0.73 7.04 
Canada yes yes 0.01 2.08 0.07 3.43 
Chile yes yes 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.58 
China no yes -0.04 -0.08 0.95 5.89 
Hong Kong no yes 0.00 -0.06 0.39 4.45 
Indonesia no yes 0.00 0.02 0.95 3.20 
Japan yes yes 0.08 2.17 0.46 3.82 
South Korea no yes -0.02 -0.07 0.77 4.33 
Mexico yes yes -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.59 
Malaysia yes yes -0.09 3.11 1.86 7.62 
New Zealand yes yes 0.33 6.33 0.95 9.05 
Peru yes yes -0.01 2.40 0.02 3.55 
Philippines no yes -0.03 0.05 0.18 2.87 
Russian Federation no yes 0.00 0.08 0.29 6.14 
Singapore yes yes 0.01 0.86 0.82 3.31 
Thailand no yes -0.09 -0.12 1.61 5.93 
Taiwan no yes -0.05 -0.07 1.94 10.77 
United States of America yes yes 0.02 1.95 0.10 2.79 
Vietnam yes yes 0.70 5.38 0.40 8.18 
Source: Authors’ calculations. No data for Brunei and Papua New Guinea.  
 
Looking at the comprehensive scenario, which also addresses non-tariff barriers, it becomes 
apparent that TPP can unlock rather sizeable gains amongst members. Again, for the same rea-
sons than those explained above, New Zealand turns out to be the biggest winner, with long-
term benefits as large as 6%. Poor countries, such as Vietnam, also have a lot to gain from better 
market access to large and mature economies such as the US or Japan. The latter benefit, too, 
but at a smaller rate of about 2%. The country with the smallest gains is Singapore. Not surpris-
ingly: this is one of the most open economies of the world, it is already extremely specialized, 
and its overall openness cannot go up by as much as is possible elsewhere. Interestingly, Mexi-
co, a TPP partner, could actually lose from the agreement. The reason is preference erosion: this 
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country, a NAFTA member, runs almost 80% of its export business with the US. If other coun-
tries, in particular Japan enjoy better access to the US markets in crucial industries such as au-
tomotive, this could crowd out Mexican producers and hurt the Mexican economy. However, 
the simulated loss is small (-0.08%). 
Looking at countries in the Pacific region that are excluded by TPP, one observes some slight 
losses for China (-0.08%) or Thailand (-0.12%). These countries are hurt by trade diversion, but 
the damage is limited due to increased demand for their products as TPP countries grow richer 
and produce and consume more. Other outsiders, such as Indonesia, actually gain, if only slight-
ly, as the demand effect outweighs trade diversion. 
Turning to the FTAAP scenario, which is defined in the same way as TPP with the difference 
that it covers additional countries, we may state that all countries (except Mexico) would gain 
from the elimination of tariffs. Countries with sizeable tariff protection, such as Taiwan or Thai-
land could gain handsomely. Other countries benefit substantially more than under the TPP 
scenario; again, the reason is that tariff barriers amongst the additional FTAAP members are 
still high. Looking at the comprehensive scenario, FTAAP benefits everyone in the group, in-
cluding Mexico. Countries with strong trade ties but no existing free trade agreement with Chi-
na benefit most. Compared to TPP, the USA has only modest advantages from FTAAP. While 
better access to the Chinese market is a big prize, the USA is not particularly competitive in 
China and faces the risk of losing market shares in other countries, such as Japan, which would, 
through FTAAP, attract more competitors from China. In a sense, the costs of containing China 
do not turn out to be very large for the US. Maybe this is the reason why the US focused on TPP 
rather than on FTAAP. 
 
7. The effects on world regions 
Next, we turn to other world regions. Table 2 reports aggregate (i.e., population weighted) gains 
from TPP and FTAAP in major economies or world regions. For non-TPP or non-FTAAP coun-
tries, the key question is whether the damaging trade diversion effects are offset by positive 
demand effects. This is an empirical question that the simulation exercise can answer. 
The table documents that the average world citizen benefits from both TPP and FTAAP, but the 
gains obtained by insiders are many times bigger than those for outsiders. The only big econom-
ic entity to lose from TPP is China. However, the damage is very limited and statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. The same is true for the EU27, which also remains largely unscathed. 
Growth in the TPP region triggered by TPP boosts demand for European products and this 
keeps the negative trade diversion effects at bay. Maybe this is the reason why EU trade com-
missioner Malmström welcomed the political breakthrough of October 5th. 
FTAAP would be much more beneficial globally than TPP as it would leave world GDP almost 
4% higher. This is due to its larger economic size: Adding China and ASEAN countries (includ-
ing regional heavy-weights such as Indonesia) does make a very significant difference. China 
and the ASEAN countries would register benefits of 6% and 5%, respectively, if they gained 
improved access to the US, Japanese and Canadian markets (amongst others). It also turns out 
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that resource rich countries, from which China sources, would benefit massively. This is true for 
the South African Customs Union (SACU), oil producing countries, or Sub-Sahara Africa. 
In other words, FTAAP is much better for the world as a whole than TPP, while the advantage 
to the USA is only minor. 
 
Table 2 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals on World Regions 
 
TPP FTAAP 
Alianza del Pacifico 0.14 1.15 
ASEAN 0.87 4.70 
Australia & New Zealand 4.77 7.32 
Canada 2.08 3.43 
Central Asia 0.06 7.75 
China -0.08 5.80 
East Asia 1.74 3.92 
EFTA 0.03 3.00 
EU27 0.02 2.90 
Eurasian Customs Union 0.07 5.84 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.16 5.06 
MENA 0.08 6.35 
MERCOSUR 0.00 2.64 
Oceania 0.25 9.36 
Oil exporters 0.38 11.75 
Rest of Europe 0.10 3.12 
SACU 0.08 7.48 
South Asia 0.04 3.54 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.07 8.27 
Turkey 0.04 2.41 
USA 1.95 2.79 
World 0.84 3.67 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
8. Zooming in on Europe 
Table 3 sheds a closer look on the effects of Pacific trade agreements on Europe and Germany. 
Overall, the TPP agreement has no measurable effect on Europe. Apparently, trade diversion 
and income effects neatly cancel each other out. Behind the averages, some countries are affect-
ed more than others. Malta, for example, a major global supplier of shipping services, could 
benefit from TPP by 0.3%. The same is true for Greece, albeit at a lower rate. Germany, on the 
other hand, is likely to lose slightly (-0.04%), the same is true for countries with similar com-
parative advantage or with strong production ties to Germany (Austria, Czech Republic, Nether-
lands, Slovak Republic). The effects are, however, statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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In contrast, the larger FTAAP agreement would have larger effects on European countries. If it 
were limited to tariffs, Germany would lose 0.23%, but the very substantial income effects trig-
gered by an agreement that does address non-tariff barriers generates much more positive ef-
fects. Europe, in spite of being an outsider, would gain 3%; this is more than the gains that the 
US, an insider, can expect. The reason is that Europe benefits much more than the US from an 
increase in global demand since it is more open. That it overtakes the US is, however, a sur-
prise. The gains are supported by strong benefits in the UK, but also in France, Germany, or 
Spain. 
These results show very strongly how strong global trade links can multilateralize the gains 
from trade arising from systemically relevant regional deals. As China grows richer from 
FTAAP, its trade partners benefit, too. An old truism is confirmed again: Growth in one region 
in the world need not be harmful to other regions if it is due to productivity improvements. 
Table 3 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals in Europe (%) 
Comprehensive Tariff only Comprehensive Tariff only
European Union 0.02 0.00 2.90 -0.08
Austria -0.03 0.00 2.36 -0.11
Belgium 0.11 0.00 5.24 -0.18
Bulgaria 0.11 0.01 4.61 0.06
Cyprus 0.18 0.01 6.44 0.23
Czech Republic -0.05 -0.01 1.47 -0.26
Germany -0.04 0.00 2.48 -0.20
Denmark 0.04 0.00 3.09 -0.03
Spain 0.06 0.00 2.62 0.02
Estonia 0.12 0.01 5.51 0.11
Finland 0.03 0.00 3.79 -0.17
France 0.04 0.00 2.60 -0.04
United Kingdom 0.06 0.00 3.57 0.01
Greece 0.13 0.01 4.64 0.13
Hungary 0.00 0.00 2.42 -0.27
Ireland 0.03 -0.02 5.84 -0.42
Italy 0.02 -0.01 2.18 -0.08
Lithuania 0.19 0.01 7.93 0.18
Luxembourg 0.14 0.00 6.25 0.02
Latvia 0.16 0.01 5.78 0.32
Malta 0.30 0.00 31.46 0.16
Netherlands -0.02 -0.01 1.70 -0.18
Poland 0.06 0.00 3.16 -0.02
Portugal 0.08 0.00 3.17 0.08
Romania 0.08 0.01 3.01 0.12
Slovakia -0.02 0.00 2.73 -0.24
Slovenia 0.07 0.00 3.70 -0.02
Sweden -0.03 0.00 2.60 -0.11
FTAAPTPP
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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9. Flexible comparative advantage 
The results discussed so far come from microeconomic simulation results that take sectoral de-
tail into account and also account for global value chains. In order to address third country ef-
fects, such a perspective is preferable to a macroeconomic view, which does not distinguish 
between different industries and, thus, may overstate trade diversion effects. However, the mac-
ro perspective implicitly assumes that the comparative advantages of countries are malleable in 
the long-run. In other words, with technology transferable internationally, the only driver of 
cross-country differences in GDP per capita is the endowment with human capital. In other 
words, even if countries specialize on certain industries in the baseline equilibrium, the long-run 
pattern can change. So, specialization patterns do not provide much of a defence against trade 
diversion effects. With TPP, Asian countries will move into producing products that have tradi-
tionally been produced in Europe. Also, as they move into new industries, any income expan-
sion in the TPP or RCEP regions will lead to smaller demand effects of Europe as a larger share 
of the new demand will be satisfied by local producers. 
Table 4 Effects of TPP with flexible comparative advantage, selected countries, % of real 
per capita income 
  %     % 
Austria -0.15  United States* 2.14 
Belgium -0.11 
 
New Zealand* 12.66 
Bulgaria -0.22 
 
Japan* 8.20 
Croatia -0.22 
 
Singapore* 4.04 
Cyprus -0.25 
 
Vietnam* 3.75 
Czech Republic -0.17 
 
Australia* 2.37 
Denmark -0.19 
 
Peru* 0.89 
Estonia -0.25 
 
Canada* 0.27 
Finland -0.28 
 
Bangladesh -0.13 
France -0.18 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.20 
Germany -0.19 
 
India -0.24 
Greece -0.24 
 
Turkey -0.24 
Hungary -0.20 
 
Kenya -0.26 
Ireland -0.24 
 
Cameroon -0.28 
Italy -0.21 
 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.39 
Latvia -0.24 
 
Korea, Rep. -0.39 
Lithuania -0.23 
 
Argentina -0.41 
Luxembourg -0.13 
 
Cambodia -0.46 
Malta -0.26 
 
Colombia -0.51 
Netherlands -0.15 
 
Brazil -0.52 
Poland -0.20 
 
Morocco -0.52 
Portugal -0.26 
 
South Africa -0.52 
Romania -0.20 
 
Russian Federation -0.64 
Slovak Republic -0.19 
 
Senegal -0.70 
Slovenia -0.17 
 
China -0.86 
Spain -0.28 
 
Chile* -1.00 
Sweden -0.25 
 
Mexico* -1.13 
United Kingdom -0.27 
 
Indonesia -1.28 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Felbermayr et al., 2015. * indicates TPP member 
states. No data for Brunei and Malaysia. 
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Table 4 shows the simulated changes in real per capita income from the macro study of Felber-
mayr et al. (2015). The gains predicted for most TPP members are larger than in the micro study 
presented in the previous chapters. But the sorting of the countries is roughly similar, with New 
Zealand benefitting the most, and Mexico and Chile the least. Again, Mexico, a TPP partner, 
could actually lose from the agreement, as could Chile. The reason is preference erosion, in 
particular with the US. 
In Felbermayr et al. (2015), all welfare changes for European countries due to turn out negative. 
The size of the effects is not very large, though. Countries with strong ties to the US lose strong-
ly from TPP. Moreover, smaller economies tend to lose more than larger ones (Finland, Baltic 
countries). Countries that are very open with respect to the entire world lose less (Austria, Bel-
gium, and Netherlands).  
The macro results describe a worst-case scenario for Europe, because they show larger diversion 
and smaller income effects than models which take the currently observed patterns of compara-
tive advantage as fixed. While these patterns are probably much less fungible than the macro 
studies implicitly assume, the results still are illustrative: they are a strong warning against tak-
ing the global shifts due to large regional trade policy initiatives not serious enough. 
 
 
10. Sectoral effects in Europe and Germany 
Next, we turn to sectoral effects and focus on Europe and Germany. This shows where vulnera-
bilities and opportunities may lie.  
Table 5 ranks the sectors in Europe according to their relative importance in the world. For ex-
ample, about 51% of world value added in the business services industry is generated in Europe. 
The Pacific agreements would slightly reduce this share, but only, if they involve reductions in 
non-tariff barriers. The metals and the leather industries, where the EU has large shares of glob-
al value added, could see sizeable reductions in their relative global weight if FTAAP is realized 
but not with TPP.  
The same holds true for the automotive industry, albeit at a much larger scale. This sector is the 
only one which faces a sizeable threat from TPP. However, this threat is dwarfed by what 
FTAAP could bring. The simulations suggest that Europe’s share in global value added, today 
around 37%, could fall by almost 18 percentage points to 19%. This would be a dramatic evolu-
tion that is mostly driven by a strong integration of the Asian production network (into non-TPP 
member countries such as China, Thailand, or Indonesia) and a resulting massive improvement 
in relative competitiveness of car producers based in Japan, South Korea and China in world 
markets, including Europe. Interestingly, this effect does not hinge on whether the US is part of 
FTAAP or not. It is really about a stronger integration of business processes in Asia. Note that 
Table 5 shows effects of value added generated in Europe by firms that may be headquartered 
around the world; it does not account for value added generated by European firms in foreign 
countries, e.g., in Asia. 
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Table 5 The EU’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP 
  
Initial share in 
world value 
added (%) 
Change in world value added share (%points) 
TPP FTAAP 
Comprehensive Tariffs only Comprehensive Tariffs only 
Business services nec 51.08 -0.17 -0.02 -0.88 -0.28 
Metal products 42.42 0.08 -0.03 -2.05 -0.64 
Leather 41.25 -0.02 -0.10 -3.14 -3.60 
Paper 37.79 -0.12 -0.02 -1.58 -0.39 
Machinery nec 37.30 0.16 -0.02 0.71 -0.68 
Motor vehicles 36.56 -1.48 -0.06 -17.98 -0.85 
Food, processed 36.33 -0.15 -0.02 -1.37 -0.76 
Chemicals 35.03 0.04 -0.04 1.27 -0.88 
Construction 33.75 -0.10 0.00 -0.97 -0.25 
Manufactures nec 33.60 -0.09 -0.02 -0.47 -0.35 
Mineral products 32.95 -0.07 -0.01 -0.49 -0.49 
Recreational services 32.61 -0.11 0.00 -0.83 -0.22 
Textiles 32.04 -0.01 -0.07 -2.24 -2.48 
Communication 31.41 -0.09 0.00 -0.50 -0.16 
Air transport 31.06 -0.28 0.01 -1.04 0.41 
Other services 29.84 -0.15 -0.01 -1.06 -0.29 
Transport nec 29.48 -0.16 -0.01 -1.03 -0.15 
Electricity 28.93 -0.14 -0.02 -1.00 -0.34 
Wood 27.58 -0.06 -0.02 -3.58 -0.26 
Electronics 24.39 -0.07 -0.02 0.32 -0.25 
Ferrous metals 23.48 -0.37 -0.14 -1.07 -0.56 
Metals nec 21.24 -0.35 -0.03 -5.89 -0.27 
Insurance 20.87 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
Water 20.73 -0.11 -0.02 -0.85 -0.24 
Financial services nec 20.42 -0.04 0.00 -0.26 -0.09 
Trade 18.89 -0.09 -0.01 -0.71 -0.17 
Agriculture & Food 17.52 -0.09 -0.04 -2.05 -0.43 
Water transport 15.11 0.08 0.00 -0.51 0.16 
Gas 13.54 -0.02 0.00 0.11 0.07 
Dwellings 11.62 -0.10 0.00 -0.65 -0.18 
Mining 5.74 0.02 0.01 1.22 0.05 
Total 29.74 -0.14 -0.01 -1.16 -0.35 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Other sectors in which Europe looks vulnerable in the FTAAP scenario are textiles, wood, met-
als, but also the agri-food sector. These vulnerabilities have various reasons and affect different 
EU member states differently. For example, stronger competitive pressure for European produc-
ers in the agri-food area would be mostly driven by the US, while the other mentioned sectors 
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are threatened by higher competition from China. Within Europe, it is mostly the Southern and 
Eastern European countries that would be affected. This becomes apparent when looking at 
Table 6, which provides results for Germany. 
For Germany, the Pacific agreements bring opportunities for the machinery sector, as higher 
growth in the Pacific regions increases demand for German investment goods. However, they 
threaten the motor vehicles sector for reasons explained above. 
 
Table 6 Germany’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP 
Comprehensive Tariff only Comprehensive Tariff only
Machinery nec 12.40 0.09 -0.01 0.45 -0.20
Motor vehicles 10.80 -0.56 -0.02 -5.23 -0.24
Business services nec 10.39 -0.04 0.00 -0.25 -0.06
Metal products 10.28 0.01 -0.01 -0.47 -0.13
Chemicals 7.70 0.07 -0.01 0.68 -0.19
Recreational services 7.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.27 -0.06
Paper 6.95 -0.02 0.00 -0.28 -0.08
Manufactures nec 6.49 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.07
Air transport 6.28 -0.04 0.00 -0.30 0.08
Electronics 6.17 0.01 0.00 0.26 -0.04
Food, processed 5.85 -0.02 0.00 -0.25 -0.14
Electricity 5.61 -0.03 0.00 -0.21 -0.07
Wood 5.34 0.00 0.00 -0.63 -0.05
Mineral products 5.34 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.09
Other services 5.17 -0.03 0.00 -0.22 -0.06
Trade 4.86 -0.03 0.00 -0.23 -0.05
Communication 4.80 -0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.03
Metals nec 4.78 -0.08 -0.01 -1.32 -0.04
Transport nec 4.77 -0.04 0.00 -0.32 -0.03
Leather 4.68 0.01 -0.01 -0.44 -0.54
Textiles 4.53 0.01 -0.01 -0.35 -0.43
Ferrous metals 4.35 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 -0.10
Water 4.24 -0.03 0.00 -0.23 -0.05
Construction 4.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.03
Financial services nec 3.91 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.02
Insurance 3.46 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.01
Dwellings 2.76 -0.03 0.00 -0.18 -0.05
Agriculture & Food 1.99 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.05
Water transport 1.58 0.01 0.00 -0.14 0.01
Gas 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.03
Mining 0.43 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.02
Total 5.86 -0.03 0.00 -0.26 -0.07
TPP FTAAP
Change in world value added share (%points)
Initial share 
in world value 
added (%)
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
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11. Conclusions 
1. Negotiations on The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement are concluded. Now, 
the text has to move to the 12 participating countries’ parliaments for ratification. In the 
US, TPP faces strong opposition, particularly in the Democratic Party. 
2. A defining feature of the agreement is the strong asymmetry amongst its members: The 
US accounts for more than 60% of GDP in the group of TPP member states; yet it relies 
far less on international trade in goods and services than its partners. The richest TPP 
country (Australia) has a GDP per capita (in current US dollars) that is more than 30 
times as large as that of the poorest member (Vietnam). 
3. While no final text on TPP is available yet, negotiators had to strike a number of diffi-
cult compromises. While ambitious in many respects, the deal does not totally eliminate 
all barriers in the agri-food sector, it does not go far in services liberalization, and it 
does very little to open public procurement. 
4. While a tariffs-only TPP would not be worth much, a medium-depth agreement (reduc-
ing tariffs, addressing non-tariff barriers such as in comparable other existing agree-
ments), TPP can raise incomes in the member states and in the world. 
5.  TPP raises real world income by about 1%. However, insiders to the deal (such as Aus-
tralia, Vietnam or the USA) reap the benefits (5%, 5%, and 2%, respectively), while 
outsiders either benefit or lose marginally. China loses from TPP, as it suffers more 
from trade diversion than other countries. Losses are, however, only minor. 
6. The FTAAP agreement, which in contrast to TPP includes China, would be much better 
for the world as TPP, as it could lift world income by almost 4%. All world regions 
would benefit; insiders more than outsiders, but many poor, resource rich economies 
(such as in Sub-Sahara Africa), with close ties to China, would benefit handsomely. 
7. For the US, FTAAP is only marginally better than TPP. This is because both agree-
ments do not cut very deeply in areas where the US is competitive in China (such as 
services), but increased competition from China in TPP markets puts additional pressure 
on US firms. 
8. For Europe, an outsider to both TPP and FTAAP, the latter is much more beneficial 
than the former. FTAAP could unlock very substantial gains in China which spill over 
to Europe through the strong production networks that have emerged between these re-
gions over the last two decades. While TPP leaves Europe essentially unaffected, 
FTAAP could lead to additional income of 3%, almost as much as the US, an insider to 
FTAAP, could expect. 
9. The optimistic outlook for Europe, however, depends on a given technological structure 
of comparative advantage. If the latter changes as a consequence of TPP, more sizeable 
losses could materialize. The same is true for China, which would lose much more (-
0.9%) than the EU (-0.2%), while effects on TPP insiders remain qualitatively similar to 
the case of fixed comparative advantage. 
10. Across all sectors, both TPP and FTAAP imply market share losses for EU and German 
industries. This does not mean that most industries shrink due to the trade pacts, but it 
does reflect an important shift in the competitiveness of the old continent.  
11. On the sectoral level, TPP turns out to be a particular threat to the European and the 
German automotive industries. This is even more pronounced in the case of FTAAP, 
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where Germany’s share in global value added could fall by almost 50%. This massive 
effect is explained by the fact that the Pacific agreements are expected to strongly re-
duce barriers in this industry so that trade diversion effects could be sizeable. Note, 
however, that the numbers report value added in Germany, not value added generated 
by German firms outside Germany. 
12. The machinery and chemicals industries in Germany could benefit from both TPP and 
FTAAP. The reason is that the former benefits strongly from higher growth abroad (due 
to increased investment demand), while the latter is sheltered as non-tariff barriers in 
this area are not assumed to change much between TPP and FTAAP partners. 
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Appendix 
Model structure 
We use the model developed and described in a technical paper (Aichele et al., 2014). This is 
the Ricardian multi-sector trade model of Caliendo and Parro (2015) with input-output linkages, 
extended by the authors to capture services trade and non-tariff measures. The model enables us 
to calculate the long-run effects of changes in tariffs and in non-tariff barriers. Because research 
shows that the long-run effect of trade opening on structural unemployment (i.e., the component 
not driven by business cycles) is broadly zero, the model takes aggregate employment as given.6 
Moreover, the model assumes perfect competition. This is an often criticized assumption; but 
recent research shows that more realistic (and complicated) modeling of economic structures 
does not lead to different aggregate predictions; see Arkolakis et al. (2012) or Felbermayr et al. 
(2015). Following Dekle et al. (2008) we allow for multilateral trade imbalances, but assume 
them to be fixed to the status quo. The TPP or FTAAP will, therefore, not change the aggregate 
balances, but their composition. 
In the specific model employed in our work, gains from trade are driven by two general mecha-
nisms: First, if trade costs fall (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), countries can better exploit their 
comparative advantages; this leads to stronger specialization. In the aggregate, this effect mani-
fests itself as a productivity gain: with the same resources (mostly: labor), a higher output can 
be achieved. Second, lower trade costs reduce prices of consumption goods and services for 
consumers and of raw materials or intermediaries for producers. In the aggregate, this contrib-
utes towards a lower price index which benefits both consumers and producers. Due to perfect 
competition, productivity gains and lower prices are fully passed over to workers, owners of 
assets (physical and natural capital), and the government (through taxes). Amongst other things, 
this implies that trade liberalization typically leads to higher real wages (i.e., one hour of work 
gives the worker a higher purchasing power).7 
Data and parameter estimation 
The model is brought to the data provided by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), base-
line 2007. It covers 17 merchandise industries, and 15 services industries (one of which, “dwell-
ings”, is non-traded) as well as 134 countries and regions.8 The GTAP data provides the input-
output tables for each country or region, which indicate how much any industry (domestic or 
foreign) supplies inputs to the production of other industries (domestic or foreign) and how 
                                            
6 More precisely, the literature actually finds that trade liberalization on average leads to small employment gains. 
See Felbermayr et al. (2011) for empirical evidence and Felbermayr et al. (2013) for simulation results related to 
the TTIP. Thus, assuming constant employment is a conservative approach. 
7 The model is more complicated than what this rough description suggests; see Aichele et al. (2014). In particular, it 
accounts for the fact that lower tariffs reduce government revenues, and that lower trade costs have complicated 
effects on global sourcing patterns (i.e., on the global production chains). 
8 Table A1 in the Appendix to Aichele et al. (2014) provides details. 
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much primary factors of production (i.e., labor) is used. The database also contains consistent 
output data and trade flow information on the bilateral industry level. 
The main advantage of the modern quantitative trade models introduced in Costinot and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2015) is their parsimony. They can be parameterized based on simple econo-
metric equations that emerge as equilibrium relationships from the model itself. And the param-
eter estimations can be conducted on exactly the same data that describes the baseline scenario 
in the analysis.9 
In the present model, two types of industry-level parameters matter most: the elasticity at which 
tariff changes affect trade flows (denoted in Table 7 by −1/𝜃) and the effect of preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) on those same flows (−𝛿/𝜃). In the latter, we distinguish between 
shallow and deep agreements, borrowing a detailed classification from Dür et al. (2014). In the 
text, we define as a comprehensive agreement a trade deal that eliminates tariffs but that is shal-
low in terms of non-tariff barriers. 
 
Table 7 Estimated trade policy effects, goods trade 
 
Source: Aichele et al. (2014), Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5, 10% level, respectively. 
                                            
9 Consistent estimation raises a number of difficult questions which Aichele et al. (2014) discuss in detail. In particu-
lar, since PTAs do not occur randomly, one needs to employ so called instrumental variable estimation. 
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Table 7 reports estimation results that are described in much more detail in the technical com-
panion paper (Aichele et al., 2014). Column (1) describes how, sector by sector, a one percent 
increase in an ad valorem tariff reduces bilateral trade. For example, a one percent increase in 
the tariff lowers exports by about 1.5% in the automotive sector but by about 11.2% in the 
chemicals industry. The estimated pattern is as expected: the less differentiated the products of 
an industry, and the more homogenous the production conditions across countries are, the 
stronger does a tariff invite consumers and businesses to divert their sourcing behavior. All es-
timates come with very small standard errors. Columns (3) and (5) report the effects of existing 
shallow and deep PTAs on trade flows. The model structure allows using the estimates from (1) 
to back out the trade cost effects of those estimates. Broadly in line with expectations, shallow 
agreements have trade cost reducing effects only in some industries (agri-food, metals, wood, 
motor vehicles) while deep agreements prove to be effective in a larger host of industries. To-
gether, in 12 out of 17 manufacturing industries, PTAs affect trade costs beyond tariffs (i.e., 
through their effect on non-tariff barriers). Note that we will set estimated PTA parameters to 
zero unless the t-statistic of positive coefficients exceeds unity.10 
Table 8 Estimated trade policy effects, services 
 
Source: Aichele et al. (2014), Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively. No trade in sector « Dwellings ». 𝜃 is assumed to be equal to 6; see Egger et al. (2012). 
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that non-tariff barriers will go down significantly in the 
automotive sector, but not so in machinery (where the t-statistic is close to but below one). In 
                                            
10 The t-statistic is computed by dividing the coefficient by its standard error. 
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the chemicals or the electronics industries, only deep integration lowers trade costs in a measur-
able way, while the paper industry benefits from shallow integration but receives no additional 
boost from a deep agreement. 
Table 8 reports estimation results for services industries. In this area, there are no tariffs. Shal-
low PTAs do not reduce non-tariff barriers in most sectors, the estimated effect is not statistical-
ly different from zero in 10 out of the 15 service industries. Given that shallow PTAs often do 
not cover services sectors, this result is not very surprising. Only deep PTAs have proven to 
reduce trade costs in a statistically significant manner in all but two sectors. Note that compar-
ing results between Table 7 and Table 8, one sees that non-tariff barriers fall by much more in 
the manufacturing area than in services. For example, the results for processed food suggest that 
a deep PTA reduces trade costs by about 39%.11 In contrast, in the area of business services, the 
cost saving effect is only about 6%.12 
  
                                            
11 1-exp(-1.564/3.140)*100%. 
12 1-exp(-(0.066+0.322)/6)*100%. 
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